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JUDGE BORK’S REMARKABLE ADHERENCE TO 
UNREMARKABLE PRINCIPLES OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
Gregory E. Maggs† 
I. INTRODUCTION
The late Judge Robert H. Bork is usually remembered as an eminent 
jurist and scholar in the fields of antitrust law and constitutional law.  His 
judicial opinions and his writings, especially The Antitrust Paradox1 and The 
Tempting of America,2 are certainly standards in these areas.  Judge Bork, 
however, also deserves acclaim for his contributions to other fields of law. 
One extremely important subject, in which Judge Bork’s judicial work has 
received little attention, is the law pertaining to national security and U.S. 
foreign relations. 
This essay discusses Judge Bork’s opinions in four important D.C. 
Circuit cases: Demjanjuk v. Meese,3 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran,4 
Finzer v. Barry,5 and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.6  In these cases, 
Judge Bork identified and followed nine very traditional principles of law 
concerning national security and foreign relations.  These principles were so 
clear and well-established that at the time they seemed unremarkable. 
Indeed, while scrutinizing nearly every other aspect of Judge Bork’s records, 
† Professor of Law and Co-Director of the National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law 
LL.M. program at the George Washington University Law School.  I worked for Judge Bork at the
American Enterprise Institute in 1990 and 1991, and stayed in close personal and professional contact
with him after that.  I am very grateful to the editors for dedicating this special issue to his memory.  In
my capacity as an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve, I worked on a number of the legal issues discussed
in this article.  The views expressed here are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army
or the Department of Defense.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
3. Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
4. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
5. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.  Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
6.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
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proponents and opponents of his nomination to the Supreme Court said very 
little about his opinions in these cases. 
How Judge Bork addressed the law in the area of national security and 
U.S. foreign relations is a subject that deserves a fresh look in light of 
important Supreme Court litigation arising out of the War on Terror.  In a 
series of cases, often decided by the narrowest of margins, Justices of the 
Supreme Court have effectively rejected each of the nine traditional 
principles that Judge Bork applied in his D.C. Circuit opinions.  Contrasting 
the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in these cases to Judge Bork’s 
very different and more restrained approach reveals another aspect of what 
was lost when the Senate failed to confirm Judge Bork’s nomination to the 
Supreme Court in 1987. 
II. FOUR CASES AND NINE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided the 
case of Demjanjuk v. Meese.7 In that case, an accused Nazi war criminal 
filed a habeas petition seeking to block his extradition from the United 
States to Israel.8  Demjanjuk claimed that the extradition would violate the 
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide.9  In his opinion for the court, Judge Bork rejected the 
petitioner’s claim for three reasons.  First, the cited Genocide Convention 
had not yet become binding on the United States.10  Although the U.S. 
Senate had approved the treaty, the United States had not yet deposited the 
formal instrument of ratification, and the treaty by its terms did not become 
effective until ninety days after ratification.11  Second, the treaty was not 
self-executing, and Congress had not enacted any implementing 
legislation.12  Third, the treaty addressed extradition only for the crime of 
genocide, and Demjanjuk was being extradited to stand trial for murder and 
 
 7.  Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d 1114. 
 8.  Id. at 1115; see also United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981) 
(providing additional background). 
 9.  See Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1115–16 (referring to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 1116–17.  See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/ 
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-1.en.pdf (the United States ultimately ratified the Convention on Nov. 
25, 1988, subject to various reservations). 
 12.  Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1116. 
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malicious wounding, not genocide.13  “Since genocide is not the basis for 
this extradition,” Judge Bork wrote, “the Genocide Convention, even if it 
were now law, would be irrelevant.”14 
In this case, Judge Bork recognized and applied three fundamental 
principles concerning national security and U.S. foreign relations, which 
might be summarized as follows: 
(1)  A treaty does not bind the United States if the United States has not 
ratified it. 
(2)  Even if a treaty is in effect, courts can enforce the treaty’s requirements 
only if the treaty is self-executing or if Congress has implemented the treaty 
through legislation. 
(3)  A treaty must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of 
its terms. 
At the time of the Demjanjuk decisions, these principles were well-
established and generally uncontroversial.  Principles (1) and (3) came 
straight from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.15  Section 
139 of that work says: “An international agreement does not, per se, impose 
an obligation upon a state not a party to it without the consent of that state.”16  
Section 147(1)(a) instructs that treaties be interpreted by “the ordinary 
meaning of the words of the agreement in the context in which they are used” 
in addition to other factors.17  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law, published the year following the Demjanjuk decision, only slightly 
rephrases these points.18  Principle (2) comes directly from the Supreme 
Court’s well-known 1888 decision in Whitney v. Robertson, which held that 
when treaty “stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced 
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect….”19  Because Judge Bork 
followed these principles so clearly in Demjanjuk and because the principles 
themselves were not particularly remarkable, no one said much about them 
 
 13.  Id. at 1117. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965). 
 16.  Id. § 139. 
 17.  Id. § 147(a)(1). 
 18.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 324 (1987) (“An international 
agreement does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.”); § 325(1) (“An 
international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 19.  Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
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during the debates regarding Judge Bork’s subsequent nomination to the 
Supreme Court. 
A second illustrative D.C. Circuit decision is Persinger v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran.20  Marine Sergeant Gregory Persinger was one of the U.S. 
embassy guards taken hostage in Tehran in 1979.  After his release, he and 
others sued the government of Iran, seeking damages for their detention and 
maltreatment.21  In his opinion for the court, Judge Bork did not allow the 
case to proceed.  However sympathetic and meritorious the plaintiffs’ 
grievances against Iran may have seemed, Judge Bork concluded that the 
court lacked jurisdiction because a federal statute said: “[A] foreign state 
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”22  
The statute contained an exception for injuries caused within the United 
States.23  But Judge Bork concluded that the U.S. embassy in Tehran was not 
“within the United States,” even though the United States asserts jurisdiction 
over its embassies for some purposes.24 
The Persinger decision exemplifies two additional principles of law 
concerning national security and U.S. foreign relations, which might be 
summarized in this way: 
(4) Although Congress may have power to regulate matters occurring 
outside the United States, federal statutes may specify that Congress has not 
done so. 
(5) U.S. installations outside of the United States are not within the territory 
of the United States, even if the United States exercises control over them. 
Each of these principles, like the previous three discussed above, were 
well-established and uncontroversial at the time of the decision.  Citing older 
precedent, the Supreme Court concisely summarized principle (4) just a short 
time after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the Persinger case as follows: 
“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the United States. . . . Whether Congress has in fact exercised 
that authority in [particular] cases is a matter of statutory construction.”25  
 
 20.  Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 21.  Id. at 837. 
 22.  Id. at 838 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976)). 
 23.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976)). 
 24.  Id. at 839. 
 25.  E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991) (alteration in original) (citing 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 
U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).  
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Principle (5) underlay the Supreme Court’s decision in cases like Johnson v. 
Eisentrager which held that an enemy prisoner held by the United States in a 
U.S. military prison in occupied Germany after World War II was not in the 
territory of the United States.26 
A third D.C. Circuit case in which Judge Bork wrote the court’s opinion 
was Finzer v. Barry.27  In that case, Father David Finzer and other anti-
communist activists wanted to protest in front of the Soviet and Nicaraguan 
embassies in Washington, D.C.28  They challenged a D.C. statute that 
prohibited displaying placards within 500 feet of any embassy if the display 
would “bring into public odium” the government of any foreign country.29  
The plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment because 
the prohibition on displaying placards was content-based, viewpoint-
discriminatory, vague, and overbroad.30 
Judge Bork rejected these arguments.  Later, some of what Judge Bork 
wrote about the First Amendment was reversed by the Supreme Court.31  But 
Judge Bork’s opinion for the D.C. Circuit is still significant because it 
applied two fundamental principles for deciding national security and U.S. 
foreign relations law cases that at least, in the abstract, were not controversial 
at the time of the case.  The plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to the 
statute required the court to determine whether the government had a 
compelling interest for its speech limitations.32  The government argued that 
the statute was necessary for national security based on the logic that how the 
United States protects foreign embassies in Washington influences how 
foreign countries protect U.S. embassies abroad.33  In evaluating this 
argument, Judge Bork observed that Congress had power to define and 
punish crimes against the law of nations under Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution.34  He then looked to the Federalist Papers and other historic 
documents to determine what this power originally was meant to embrace.35  
Judge Bork concluded that “the framers understood that the protection of 
 
 26.  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950) (concluding that the alien enemy “at no 
relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within [the United States’] territorial jurisdiction”). 
 27.  Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.  Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 28.  Id. at 1452. 
 29.  Id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 22-1115 (1981)). 
 30.  Id. at 1470. 
 31.  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (holding that D.C. CODE § 22-1115 violates the 
First Amendment). 
 32.  Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1458. 
 33.  Id. at 1462. 
 34.  Id. at 1454 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). 
 35.  Id. at 1457 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay)). 
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foreign embassies from insult was one of the central obligations of the law of 
nations.”36  This factor counted strongly in favor of the law.  In addition, 
Judge Bork said that courts must defer to the political branches in cases 
involving foreign affairs.37  Accordingly, Judge Bork agreed that the 
government had a compelling interest for the restrictions.38 
In this decision, we can see two additional principles of national security 
and foreign relations law, which might be summarized as follows: 
(6) History should guide courts in answering difficult questions about the 
scope of the U.S. government’s power over foreign affairs. 
(7) Courts traditionally defer to the President and Congress on issues 
concerning foreign policy. 
Although disagreements may arise about the application of these principles 
in particular cases, the principles themselves were at the time rather 
unremarkable.  A well-known example of principle (6) appears in Reid v. 
Covert, a case that considered the United States’ “entire constitutional history 
and tradition” when confronted with the question whether treaties were 
subject to limitations of the Constitution.39  For principle (7), Judge Bork 
relied on Regan v. Wald, which emphasized the “classical deference [owed 
by courts] to the political branches in matters of foreign policy.”40 
A fourth D.C. case in which Judge Bork wrote an opinion is Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic.41  That litigation arose out of a horrific 1978 terrorist 
attack on a bus in Israel which killed dozens and seriously wounded even 
more.42  The plaintiffs were some of the victims or their representatives.43  
They sued the Palestine Liberation Organization and other defendants who 
allegedly orchestrated the attacks.44 They claimed violations of several 
treaties, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Hague Conventions 
on the Law of War, and the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.45  
Judge Bork and the two other judges on the panel all agreed the lawsuit 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1459. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion). See also id. at 46 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (approving reliance on history). 
 40.  Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1459 (quoting  Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984)). 
 41.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
 42.  Id. at 799. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 798, 808. 
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should be dismissed.46  But they could not agree on the reason.  The judges 
accordingly issued a very brief per curiam opinion announcing the judgment.  
They each then wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment.47 
Judge Bork made several notable points in his separate opinion.  First, he 
asserted that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action.48  He reasoned 
that the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Convention, and the other cited 
treaties did not create one because these treaties required implementing 
legislation, and Congress had not passed a statute giving individuals rights 
that they could enforce in court.49  Judge Bork also observed that these 
treaties mostly regulated the treatment of prisoners captured in a war.  
Allowing such prisoners to bring lawsuits, he reasoned, could not have been 
intended because there could be thousands of lawsuits filed by prisoners of 
war “who might think their rights under the . . . Conventions violated in the 
course of any large-scale war.”50  Judge Bork said those lawsuits might be 
beyond the capacity of the legal system to resolve and innumerable private 
suits at the end of a war might be an obstacle to peace.51  Second, Judge Bork 
observed that the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention were not binding 
on the United States because the United States had not ratified these 
Protocols.52  Third, based on separation of powers concerns, Judge Bork 
rejected the view that “federal common law automatically provides a cause 
of action for international law violations, as it would for violations of other 
federal common law rights.”53 
Judge Bork’s opinion adhered to two of the principles of law previously 
mentioned: treaties do not bind the United States if they have not yet been 
ratified and that implementing legislation may be needed to supply rights to 
individuals.  In addition, Judge Bork also followed two additional principles, 
both of which involve judicial restraint: 
(8) Treaties should not be construed to produce intolerable results that could 
not have been intended (e.g., innumerable lawsuits by prisoners captured in 
a war). 
 
 46.  Id. at 775 (per curiam). 
 47.  See id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 823 (Robb, J., 
concurring). 
 48.  Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 49.  Id. at 809. 
 50.  Id. at 810. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 808–09. 
 53.  Id. at 810. 
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(9) Separation of powers concerns should limit judicial innovation in 
matters that concern foreign affairs. 
These principles, like the others previously identified, were at the time, 
unremarkable.  The Supreme Court followed principle (8) just a few years 
later in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., indicating that absurd interpretations 
of a treaty must be dismissed.54  Principle (9) found expression in Harisiades 
v. Shaughnessy, where the Supreme Court said:  
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the 
war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.  Such 
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government 
as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.55 
Critics of Judge Bork disagreed with other aspects of his jurisprudence 
during his confirmation hearing.  Yet they said little about these nine general 
principles.  In retrospect, however, as events have unfolded, Judge Bork’s 
adherence to these nine principles is quite noteworthy because jurists who 
were appointed to the Supreme Court after the Senate chose not to confirm 
Judge Bork decided to take a very different approach in cases raising 
extremely important legal issues in the fields of national security and U.S. 
foreign relations. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DEPARTURE FROM THE PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED 
BY JUDGE BORK 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in a 
global war on terror.  The war has spilled significant American blood and 
cost great treasure.  It also may have produced more Supreme Court litigation 
than any war in history.  Most notably, over the past decade, the Supreme 
Court decided four important cases concerning the rights of detained 
enemies.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,56 the Court held that the Due Process clause 
required an independent tribunal to determine whether prisoners are properly 
classified as detainable enemy combatants.57  In Rasul v. Bush,58 Hamdan v. 
 
 54.  Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989). 
 55.  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,  342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952). 
 56.  Hamdi v. Rumsfield,  542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 57.  Id. at 509. 
 58.  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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Rumsfeld,59 and Boumediene v. Bush,60 the Court held that the federal courts 
had habeas corpus jurisdiction over the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. In Hamdan, the Court also struck down the use of military 
commissions—as they were then constituted—to try enemy combatants for 
war crimes.61  In each of these cases, a majority or plurality of the Supreme 
Court effectively rejected one or more of the nine basic principles that Judge 
Bork followed. 
Principle (1), described above, was that treaties do not bind the United 
States until the United States ratifies them and they become effective.  The 
plurality opinion in Hamdan, however, did not follow this principle.  Instead, 
the plurality opinion concluded that military commissions did not satisfy one 
of the guarantees in Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions.62  The 
plurality reached this conclusion even though it acknowledged that the 
United States had not ratified the Protocol.63  No crystal ball or vivid 
imagination is necessary for surmising how Judge Bork would have handled 
this issue; Judge Bork not only concluded that treaties are not effective until 
ratified in the Demjanjuk case,64 but also specifically rejected claims under 
Protocol I in the Tel-Oren decision.65 
Principle (2) was that even if treaties are in effect, courts can enforce 
them only if they are self-executing or if Congress has implemented the 
treaties’ terms through legislation.  The Court in Hamdan, however, also did 
not follow this principle.  It determined that a private litigation could assert 
that the Geneva Conventions constrained the President’s war powers even 
though these conventions do not have applicable implementing legislation.66  
This decision was remarkable because, as Justice Thomas pointed out in 
dissent, the Supreme Court previously had held in Johnson v. Eisentrager67 
 
 59.  Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 60.   Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 61.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624. 
 62.  Id. at 633 (Stevens., J.) (concluding that the procedures for military commissions which 
allowed exclusion of the accused from the courtroom when necessary to protect classified evidence violate 
a provision in Protocol I giving the accused a right to be present during trial). 
 63.  Id. at 634. Justice Kennedy, who joined other portions of Justice Stevens’s opinion, found it 
unnecessary to decide whether “Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is binding law 
notwithstanding the earlier decision by our Government not to accede to the Protocol.” Id. at 654 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 64.  See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 65.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808–09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, 
J., concurring). 
 66.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 625–27. 
 67.  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  
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that the Geneva Convention did not create private rights.68  Again, the 
question of how Judge Bork would have handled the issue is not a mystery.  
In his Tel-Oren opinion, he concluded that the Geneva Conventions were not 
self-executing.69  Although the majority in Hamdan disagreed, the logic of 
Judge Bork’s position was not lost on others.  Just months after the Hamdan 
decision, in a bipartisan move, Congress promptly addressed the Supreme 
Court’s deviation by declaring in the Military Commissions Act of 2006: 
“No alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military 
commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a 
basis for a private right of action.”70 
Principle (3), described above, is that courts must interpret treaties 
according to their ordinary meaning.  The Supreme Court also strayed from 
this principle in the Hamdan case when it concluded that a suspected al 
Qaeda conspirator had rights under common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.71 Common Article 3 applies to conflicts “not of an international 
character.”72  The Court concluded that the global war on terror was “not of 
an international character” because, among other factors, “the commentaries 
[to the Geneva Conventions] . . . make clear ‘that the scope of application of 
the Article must be as wide as possible.’”73 Justice Thomas’s dissent 
disagreed, observing: “The conflict with al Qaeda is international in character 
in the sense that it is occurring in various nations around the globe.”74  It 
takes little speculation to imagine which interpretation of common Article 3 
is more like Judge Bork’s ordinary meaning interpretation of the treaty 
provision at issue in Demjanjuk. 
Principle (4) was that, even though Congress may have power to regulate 
matters occurring outside the United States, federal statutes may specify that 
Congress has not exercised this power.  The Supreme Court’s antagonism 
toward this seemingly uncontroversial principle appeared in both the Rasul 
and Hamdan cases.  In Rasul, the Court allowed detainees held at the 
Guantanamo Bay naval base to bring habeas corpus actions in federal court.75  
 
 68.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 715–16 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that “both of 
Hamdan’s Geneva Convention claims are foreclosed by Johnson v. Eisentrager” because 
responsibility for enforcement of the Conventions was committed to “political and military 
authorities” rather than the courts). 
 69.  Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809. 
 70.  10 U.S.C. § 948b(e) (2014) (citations omitted). 
 71.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. 
 72.  Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)]. 
 73.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631 (quoting Geneva Convention (III), cmt. 36). 
 74.  Id. at 719 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 75.  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004). 
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The Court reasoned that the federal habeas statute allows a court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a habeas detainee if the detainee’s custodian is within the 
court’s jurisdiction.76  The Court recognized that its decision contradicted a 
key precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager, which had interpreted the federal 
habeas corpus statute to require the detainee, rather than the custodian, to be 
within the court’s jurisdiction (and which accordingly would have precluded 
jurisdiction over any detainees at Guantanamo Bay).77 The dissent in Rasul 
protested what it considered to be the overruling of Eisentrager.78  Congress 
subsequently sided with the dissent and promptly responded by enacting the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.79  This Act, in unmistakable terms, 
specifies that: “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf 
of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba . . . .”80  The government thought that this statute would put an end to 
the habeas litigation arising from Guantanamo.81  But in Hamdan, the 
Supreme Court concluded the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to 
pending cases and thus did not preclude its exercise of jurisdiction.82  Justice 
Scalia’s dissent criticized this decision, asserting that the majority had not 
respected Congress’s choice with respect to the extraterritorial application of 
the habeas corpus statute to Guantanamo Bay.83  The dissent also observed 
that the Court’s decision undermined the purpose of the Detainee Treatment 
Act because habeas corpus actions had already been filed on behalf of all 
Guantanamo detainees.84  As Justice Scalia put it: “The Court’s interpretation 
transforms a provision abolishing jurisdiction over all Guantanamo-related 
habeas petitions into a provision that retains jurisdiction over cases 
sufficiently numerous to keep the courts busy for years to come.”85 He 
further asserted that the Court’s interpretation also strayed from a firm 
tradition that amendments to jurisdictional statutes apply to pending cases.86  
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 479 (concluding that another precedent had already overruled Eisentrager). 
 78.  Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
 80.  Id. § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739-2740 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
 81.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557, 574–75 (2006). 
 82.  Id. at 575–76. 
 83.  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 669 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that over 600 habeas petitions were 
pending, including one that covered all detainees at Guantanamo Bay). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 659–660 (“[The majority] cannot cite a single case in the history of Anglo–American law 
(before today) in which a jurisdiction-stripping provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases, 
absent an explicit statutory reservation.”). 
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Based on what he said in Persinger, it takes little effort to imagine which 
view Judge Bork would have agreed with. 
Principle (5) was that U.S. installations outside of the United States are 
not within the territory of the United States, even if the United States 
exercises control over them.  In Boumediene, however, the Court reached the 
opposite conclusion.  After the Court effectively nullified the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 in Hamdan, a shocked Congress immediately 
responded by amending the federal habeas corpus statute.  The amendment, 
passed by a bi-partisan vote, repeated the Detainee Treatment Act’s 
prohibition on the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay and then said in unambiguous terms: 
The amendment . . . shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, 
transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by 
the United States since September 11, 2001.87 
As Judge Randolph wrote in an opinion for the D.C. Circuit interpreting the 
amendment, “It is almost as if the proponents of these words were slamming 
their fists on the table shouting ‘When we say “all,” we mean all—without 
exception!’”88  This amendment was so clear that it prevented the Supreme 
Court from concluding in Boumediene, as it had done in Rasul and Hamdan, 
that the habeas corpus statute provided jurisdiction.89  What the Court 
decided instead was that Congress violated the Constitution by depriving the 
federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, without formally suspending the writ of habeas corpus.90  The 
Court reasoned that the extensive U.S. control of the navy base made the 
base functionally the equivalent of U.S. territory.91  The dissent rejected this 
conclusion for a simple reason:  “Guantanamo Bay lies outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States.”92  With which reasoning would Judge Bork, 
who concluded that U.S. embassies are not in the United States, have agreed? 
Principle (6), described above, called for judges to rely on historic 
practice and precedent to resolve difficult questions about the power of the 
 
 87.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7(b), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
 88.  Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 89.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736 (2008). 
 90.  Id. at 771. 
 91.  Id. (holding that the habeas corpus suspension clause, art. I, § 9, cl. 2, “has full effect at 
Guantanamo Bay”). 
 92.  Id. at 832 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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government over foreign affairs.  In the recent War on Terror cases, the 
Supreme Court has given little weight to history and precedent.  Consider 
just the Court’s decision in Hamdan and all that Congress had to do 
subsequently to restore the law.  In addition to the habeas corpus and Geneva 
Convention issues discussed above, the Court departed from history in three 
other ways.  First, the Court concluded that the President did not have any 
specific statutory authorization under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) to use military commissions to try war crimes,93 even though the 
Supreme Court previously had held that a nearly identically worded 
provision of the predecessor law, the Articles of War, did give the President 
this authority.94  Congress responded to this holding by giving the President 
specific authority: “The President is authorized to establish military 
commissions under this chapter for offenses triable by military 
commission . . . .”95  Second, the Court also concluded that the UCMJ 
required the procedural and evidentiary rules for military commissions to be 
“uniform insofar as practicable” with the rules for courts-martial.96  The 
Court ignored the history of this provision, which was to make procedures 
uniform not between courts-martial and military commissions but uniform 
among the various services in the Armed Forces.97  Congress responded to 
this holding by revising the UCMJ to say:  “All rules and regulations made 
under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable, except insofar as 
applicable to military commissions . . . .”98  Third, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court concluded that a conspiracy to commit violations of the law of war is 
not itself a violation of the law of war and that therefore such a conspiracy 
cannot be tried by a military commission absent additional Congressional 
authorization.99 This position is difficult to square with a long history of prior 
cases in which the defendants had been charged with conspiring to commit a 
violation of the law of war.100  In response to the plurality’s conclusion, 
 
 93.  Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 94.  Id. at 683 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942)) (explaining 
that Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821, is the successor to Article 15 of the 
Articles of War, which was held by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin to “authoriz[e] trial of offenses 
against the law of war before [military] commissions”). 
 95.  10 U.S.C. § 948b(b). 
 96.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622 (emphasis omitted) (interpreting Uniform Code of Military Justice 
art. 36(b), 10 U.S.C. § 836(b), prior to its subsequent amendment). 
 97.  Id. at 711 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the preamble of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and explaining that “[t]he vision of uniformity that motivated the adoption of the UCMJ, embodied 
specifically in Article 36(b), is nothing more than uniformity across the separate branches of the armed 
services”). 
 98.  10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2014). 
 99.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 611–12 (plurality). 
 100.  Id. at 698 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Congress immediately made conspiracy a crime that is triable by military 
commission.101 The Supreme Court’s ahistorical reasoning in Hamdan, 
simply put, is not the approach of Judge Bork in the Finzer case. 
Principle (7) was that courts should defer to the President and Congress 
in matters of foreign policy.  Perhaps the clearest departure from this 
principle occurred in Hamdi, where the Court refused to defer to the 
President’s determination of who is an enemy combatant and who is not, 
requiring an independent tribunal to perform that function.102  Deference 
would have required a different result.  As Justice Thomas put the matter in 
his dissent: 
The Executive Branch, acting pursuant to the powers vested in the 
President by the Constitution and with explicit congressional approval, 
has determined that Yaser Hamdi is an enemy combatant and should 
be detained.  This detention falls squarely within the Federal 
Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to 
second-guess that decision.103 
Judge Bork would have applied principle (7) in the same manner and reached 
the same conclusion. 
Principle (8) was that treaties should not be construed to produce 
intolerable results that could not have been intended.  The Supreme Court not 
only deviated from this principle but also allowed precisely the result that 
Judge Bork identified in Tel-Oren as being intolerable: innumerable lawsuits 
by prisoners captured in a war.104  In Hamdan, as discussed above, the Court 
allowed hundreds of cases by detainees to go forward with their claims under 
the Geneva Conventions.105 
Principle (9) was that separation of powers concerns should limit judicial 
involvement in foreign affairs.  As described above, in all of its decisions, the 
Supreme Court has disagreed with Congress and the President on how to 
conduct the War on Terror and substituted its own judgment for that of the 
elected political branches.  Even when Congress responded with amended 
statutes, the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected the legislative will.  Here, we 
do not need to speculate about what Judge Bork would have thought.  In a 
2005 essay, A War the Courts Shouldn’t Manage, Judge Bork and his co-
author David B. Rivkin Jr., specifically criticized the courts for their 
 
 101.  See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (2014). 
 102.  Hamdi v. Rumsfield,  542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 103.  Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 104.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 105.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 669 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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usurpation of the President’s power.106  They explained the problem as 
follows:  “Courts have neither the constitutional authority nor the expertise 
and information to override the president’s determinations on issues such as 
whether we are in armed conflict or what kind of anti-terrorist cooperation 
we should engage in with foreign governments.”107 This reasoning echoes 
what Judge Bork said in the 1980s in his four decisions regarding 
international law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What should observers make of all of this?  Judge Bork’s rulings in the 
1980s were unremarkable at the time.  But they are remarkable now because 
what seemed uncontroversial in the 1980s has been so consistently rejected 
by the Supreme Court in the litigation arising out of the War on Terror.  The 
cases discussed above show another aspect of what was lost when Judge 
Bork’s confirmation struggle came out the wrong way.  Judge Bork would 
have made a substantial contribution not only in constitutional law cases, but 
also in cases involving national security and U.S. foreign relations.  I suspect 
that additional research would find many other areas, besides constitutional 
law and antitrust law, in which his exclusion from the Supreme Court had 
significant deleterious consequences. 
 
 
 106. Robert H. Bork & David B. Rivkin Jr., A War the Courts Shouldn’t Manage, WASH. POST, Jan. 
21, 2005, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25275-2005Jan20.html. 
 107. Id. 
